Basra is a test for three

And it's one hell of a test. In fact, you could compare it to a final exam. I just can't stress this enough. What the country is going to look like for the next five years is being decided right now.

First, it's a test for the whole concept of withdrawal and letting Iraqi forces take control of their own country. I wish them all the best but I am not optimistic right now.

Second, it's a test for Prime Minister Maliki, who has vowed to finally crack down on the Mahdi Army:

The crackdown is a big gamble for Maliki. Failure could weaken his fragile coalition of support at a time he is trying to unite Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis to pass important laws on oil revenue sharing. In the short term, the crackdown could collapse a cease-fire ordered by Sadr in August. Sadr's cease-fire, along with the increase in U.S. troops and the rise of Sunni chieftains against Islamist extremists, has been credited for lowering violence throughout the country.

Longer term, a failure to dislodge the militias in Basra could sow instability in other areas of the country, undermining the authority of the Iraqi government and delaying the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

"The fight is another potential turning point," said John McCreary, a former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst. "If Maliki does not win in Basra, he will not win anywhere, and instability will increase. If he stabilizes Basra, he gets the chance to repeat his success in another town."

Or stated more simply:

It is also a major test for Maliki's ability to prove Iraqi forces can stand on their own and allow US forces to withdraw.

Last but not least, it's a test for the British:

British forces, who can probably cobble together an armoured battle group of a few hundred soldiers, may well be asked to intervene should the Iraqi offensive fail. If that happens, any hope of the withdrawal promised by Gordon Brown last year of another 1,500 British troops this spring will have to be shelved until Basra can be stabilised.

It may even be necessary to reinforce the British contingent with more combat troops, something that the Ministry of Defence can ill afford as it prepares for the fighting season in Afghanistan.

The only other option would be for Britain to admit finally that it has lost the fight in southern Iraq. That would mean an ignominious withdrawal and handing over control of Basra to the Americans, who grudgingly would have to take over responsibility for the south. As American officers and officials have privately made clear, much of today’s problems in Basra can be traced back to Britain’s failure to commit the forces necessary to control Basra and southern Iraq in general.

Whereas President Bush’s “surge” tactic of sending 30,000 reinforcements to central Iraq has succeeded in bringing down the level of violence in Baghdad and Anbar province, the Americans believe that the gradual withdrawal of British troops from the south has had the opposite effect, a point that Mr al-Maliki and his soldiers are discovering to their cost on the streets of Basra today

Some great comment on the above Times Online article at Hot Air.



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